Corporate and Commercial Law Survey by Rabouin, Michelle & Leo, Anthony Michael
Denver Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 14 
February 2021 
Corporate and Commercial Law Survey 
Michelle Rabouin 
Anthony Michael Leo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Michelle Rabouin & Anthony Michael Leo, Corporate and Commercial Law Survey, 69 Denv. U. L. Rev. 907 
(1992). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided twelve cases of
interest dealing with Commercial and Corporate Law. Four of the cases
involve banking, four address corporations or contracts issues, three are
trade regulations cases and the last is a joint venture case.
The four banking cases represent the more important develop-
ments in 1991, reflecting the continued deference and broad construc-
tion the Tenth Circuit affords banking legislation in the face of
continuing economic difficulties. The remaining eight cases evidence a
more straightforward approach toward the application of existing law.
This Article addresses each of these twelve cases and highlights the judi-
cial restraint and conservative approach exhibited by the court.
II. BANKING CASES
Historical Background
The savings and loan crisis of the past decade generated much at-
tention, spurring federal regulation designed to strengthen the entire
banking system.1 In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)2 in response
to financial industry failures. This law created the Resolution Trust Cor-
poration (RTC) and gave it authority to override state branch banking
laws, which precluded banks obtaining failing or failed thrifts through
emergency acquisitions from operating these thrifts as branches.3 On
June 1, 1990, pursuant to the provisions of FIRREA, the RTC issued a
regulation known as the "Override Regulation." '4 This regulation en-
ables the RTC to sell a branch of a failed savings and loan to a bank,
which may then operate the facility as its own branch, notwithstanding
state prohibitions on branching within the state.5
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE UNDER FIRREA AND OTHER ACTS
A. The Validity of the Override Regulation: State of Colorado v.
Resolution Trust Corp.
6
In 1991 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the
issue of the validity of the Override Regulation. The case was combined
1. Ronald R. Glancz, Thrift Industry Restructured- An Overview of FIRREA, 36 FED. BAR
NEWS &J. 472, 472 (1989).
2. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9, 1989).
3. Id at § 501.
4. 12 C.F.R. § 1611.1 (1990).
5. Id.
6. 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991).
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from a New Mexico case in which the federal district court upheld the
regulation, 7 and a Colorado case in which the federal district court de-
termined the regulation to be void and contrary to the provisions of
FIRREA.8 The Tenth Circuit held that the RTC's interpretation of FIR-
REA rests on a permissible construction of the statute and that Congress
had properly granted broad rulemaking authority to the RTC.9 Thus,
the court upheld the Override Regulation and ruled that FIRREA can
serve as a source of federal branching authority.' 0 Additionally, the
court held that the RTC regulation violates neither the McFadden Act
nor the Regulatory Flexibility Act. "1
The court first narrowly framed the issue as whether an override of
anti-branch banking law is a valid exercise of the RTC's rulemaking
power under FIRREA.12 Answering affirmatively, the court relied on
Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 13 for the proposition that
where Congress has spoken unambiguously to the power of an agency
courts are required to give effect to that intent.1 4 The court found clear,
unambiguous language indicating that the Emergency Acquisitions pro-
visions of FIRREA provide the RTC authority to issue a regulation over-
riding state branching laws that preclude nationally chartered banks
from converting acquired failed thrifts into branches.15 Employing a
sweeping standard of deference, the court held that RTC's interpreta-
tion that FIRREA authorized its actions was proper, given the back-
ground and language of FIRREA and legislative intent giving the RTC
broad authority in implementing FIRREA. The court found especially
persuasive the fact that the statute explicitly applied "notwithstanding
any provision of state law."' 6 Next, the court considered the states' ar-
gument that the RTC regulation directly conflicted with the McFadden
Act, which both Colorado and New Mexico contended was the exclusive
source of national bank branch approval.17 The court gave great defer-
ence to the Comptroller's interpretation of the National Banking Act,
and by doing so, implicitly held that FIRREA exists as an independent
source of federal branching authority.
Although much of the majority opinion is devoted to the statutory
construction of FIRREA and the RTC's authority to override state
branch banking laws, the decision has other significance. One practical
7. Independent Community Bankers Ass'n v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. Civ.- 90-
0532SG, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18584 (D. N.M. June 15, 1990).
8. State of Colorado v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 90-Z-190, 1990WL51191, (D.
Colo. Feb. 14, 1991).
9. 926 F.2d at 936-37.
10. Id. at 944-45.
11. Id at 945-48.
12. it at 936.
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. 926 F.2d at 936.
15. Id at 936-37.
16. Id at 937 (relying on this language, the court stated that it grants the Resolution
Trust Corporation broad authority to override state law that interferes with enumerated
emergency acquisitions).
17. Id. at 945.
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result of the decision is that it enlarges the class of potential purchasers
of failed thrifts. Pursuant to the RTC regulation, bank holding compa-
nies no longer possess exclusive authority to purchase a thrift with facili-
ties in multiple counties because now single unit commercial banks may
also enter the bidding process. This invites hightened competitive bid-
ding, which may result in lower costs to the American public.
Additionally, although the RTC regulation in question only
preempts state laws barring intrastate branching, FIRREA may be inter-
preted as providing a source of authority for intrastate branching. This
is because the RTC may rely upon this precedent and upon the override
powers to supplant other ,limitations. Also, given the continuing na-
tional trend in the banking industry toward consolidation and centraliza-
tion and the RTC's apparent preference for selling thrifts in their
entirety rather than in a piecemeal fashion to presumably larger banks
or holding companies, these larger institutions may gain a significant
advantage due to the broad lender authority that results from a network
of branches. These suppositions, when compounded with the fact that
many larger institutions are nationally chartered banks, make it clear
that the decision could, in effect, promote the erosion of the competitive
equality doctrine. Finally, despite the fact that many states are gradually
legislatively authorizing branch banking anyway, this precedent of defer-
ential review may be read to extend to other, non-branching-related
state banking laws.
B. The Standard and Scope of review of Banking Insolvency Decisions:
Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision' 8
Franklin Savings addressed the appropriate scope and standard of
review to be used by a court when a bank challenges the Director of the
Office of Thrift Supervision (Director) in his decision to appoint the
RTC as conservator. The Tenth Circuit held that review is limited to the
administrative record, and that the appointment may be set aside only if
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law. 19 The decision shows that the court gives
great deference to the regulator as an expert decision maker, and that
judicial review of evidence outside of the administrative record will be
upheld only in very limited circumstances.
20
In Franklin Savings, a state-chartered savings and loan association
and its parent company brought suit challenging the Director's decision
to appoint a conservator for the thrift. The Director had determined the
thrift to be unsafe and unsound to transact business due to its aggressive
and financially risky operative strategies. The thrift's management chal-
lenged the Director's decision and conclusions.
18. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1992)
(No. 91-1139).
19. Id. at 1142.
20. Id. at 1139-40.
19921
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The district court had conducted a hybrid, de novo review allowing
counsel for the the thrift to cross-examine witnesses, depose expert wit-
nesses and submit other evidence outside of the three-volume adminis-
trative record. The district court found that the Director lacked any
factual basis for appointing a conservator and that the appointment was
arbitrary and capricious. The court then ordered the removal of the
conservator.
2 1
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.
22
The court first framed the issue as whether a district court can base its
decision on evidence outside of the administrative record, and what de-
gree of deference is due a Director's decision to appoint a conservator.
After finding no guidance in the organic law, the court found that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) confined the scope of review of a
challenged appointment of a conservator under FIRREA to the informa-
tion before the Director at the time of the decision. Thus, the adminis-
trative record provided the limits of review. 23 After reviewing the
statutory scheme, the legislative history, the APA and the applicable
state law the Tenth Circuit made it clear that the reviewing court should
be particularly deferential when judging an agency's predictive judg-
ment, and that in cases like Franklin Savings, the decisions regarding in-
solvency remain particularly within the agency's field of discretion and
expertise.2 4 While the court reaffirmed the arbitrariness, capricious-
ness, and abuse of discretion standard, it seems to have applied a nar-
row, seemingly erroneous standard.
Franklin Savings demonstrates that the court will give broad defer-
ence to challenged decisions made by regulators of financial institutions
regarding future financial stability. The Tenth Circuit's rather broad in-
terpretation of the APA implicitly presumes that the Director's decision
is correct, thereby making challenges difficult. In view of well-settled
administrative law in this area, the Franklin Savings decision appears de-
fensible. The decision further demonstrates the great deference the
Tenth Circuit gives to regulators in this area. While the trial court ap-
parently viewed its role quite broadly, the appellate court narrowed the
permissible examination, crafting a standard of review that in practice
inhibits successful regulatory challenges.
C. Decision to Close Bank for Insolvency is Unreviewable in a Pre-closure
Proceeding: American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke
2 5
In American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke, the Tenth Circuit held that the
Comptroller's decision to close a bank determined to be insolvent is un-
reviewable in pre-closure proceedings. 2 6 American Bank had been
21. Id. at 1135-36.
22. Id. at 1151.
23. Id. at 1137.
24. Id. at 1145-46.
25. 933 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1991).
26. Id at 901.
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purchased by a group of investors who were informed, pre-sale, that the
bank required an infusion of $2.4 million to raise its equity capital to the
minimum regulatory level. The investors made this cash infusion and
bought the bank. Yet after examining the financial state of the bank
again and determining that additional losses necessitated further capital
influx, the Comptroller threatened to declare the bank insolvent and
place it into FDIC receivership. After notice of a pending closure, the
bank obtained an injunction on the grounds that the Comptroller
should not be able to make a demand for new capital so soon after a
purchase, and the new owners should be given more time to make the
bank profitable.
27
The district court found the bank's arguments persuasive and tem-
porarily enjoined the Comptroller from closing the bank. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, relying on Adams v.
Nagle,28 a 1938 U. S. Supreme Court decision holding that the Comp-
troller's decision to close a bank determined to be insolvent is unreview-
able in a pre-closure proceeding. 29 The court rejected the bank's
argument that the APA overruled Adams and noted that the APA pre-
cludes judicial review of agency action when agencies are given discre-
tionary decision-making powers or when review is precluded by another
statute.3 0 The court concluded there was neither a relevant statutory
grant of discretion nor a preclusion of review in this instance. Nonethe-
less, after looking at express language in the enabling statute, the statu-
tory scheme, the statutory objectives, the legislative history and the
nature of the administrative action involved, the court found no clear
evidence of legislative intent that pre-closure decisions are unreview-
able.3 1 The court found that the language of the statute authorizing the
Comptroller to appoint a receiver for insolvent banks gave the Comp-
troller great discretion. Furthermore, the court determined that while a
subsequent revision of the National Bank Act provides for review of
such decisions, the review here was explicitly post-closure. Finally, the
court recognized that judicial intervention preventing or postponing
bank closures would reduce the Comptroller's ability to respond to rap-
idly changing circumstances of banking activity, thus defeating the pur-
pose of the banking laws.3 2 Once again this case demonstrates the
Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to second-guess regulators' determina-
tions of bank insolvency-an area where regulator expertise is pre-
sumed. In doing so, the court broadens the scope of non-reviewability
under the APA.
27. IdL at 900-01.
28. 303 U.S. 532 (1938).
29. 933 F.2d at 901.
30. Id. at 902.
31. Id. at 903-04.
32. Id. at 903.
1992]
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D. Setoff Based on Two Separate and Unrelated Commercial Transactions
During Receivership is Impermissible: Grady Properties Co. v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
33
Under the National Bank Act, when a bank is declared insolvent and
it goes into receivership, the debts of the institution are prioritized for
repayment and the general creditors stand in line for repayment with
other creditors.3 4 Often, however, there are several transactions be-
tween the institution and its creditors, which, if offset, reduce the
amount of loss suffered by the creditor. Conceivably, such a setoff can
increase the potential liability of the federal insuring agencies.
In Grady Properties, a bank, later declared insolvent, owed fees to a
law firm. The law firm owned land encumbered by mortgage liens held
by the bank. Following the bank's insolvency and reorganization, the
law firm transferred its interest in the encumbered land and assigned its
accounts receivable in the fees owed by the bank to Grady Properties.
Grady Properties notified the bank that it had offset the mortgages on
the land against the debts of the insolvent bank. The reorganized bank,
however, refused to accept Grady's offset. Grady Properties brought a
quiet title action on the properties encumbered by the mortgages, claim-
ing that the mortgages should be canceled due to the refusal of Grady's
attempted setoff. The reorganized bank itself was deemed insolvent and
FSLIC became its receiver. FSLIC removed the action to federal court.
The district court determined that the setoff was based on two sepa-
rate, unrelated commercial transactions completed without the agree-
ment of the reorganized savings and loan.3 5 The district court stated
that since the reorganized bank had rejected the setoff, Grady Properties
had to stand in line with the bank's other general creditors. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating
that the case of Scott v. Armstrong3 6 provides the correct rule for setoffs
under the National Banking Act. The Scott decision stated that setoff is
not prohibited by the national banking laws when the agreements un-
derlying the setoff demonstrate the contemplation of a mutual transac-
tion.3 7 Furthermore, setoff agreements may be implied from the nature
of the transactions. 3 8 The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the Grady
Properties transactions were separate and unrelated commercial transac-
tions which did not comport with mutuality of obligation as defined in
Scott.3 9
33. 927 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1991).
34. Kevin J. Foley, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Wood: The FDIC, the Failed
Bank, and the Seemingly Insurmountable Presumption, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 693, 712 (1986).
35. 927 F.2d at 530.
36. 146 U.S. 499 (1892).
37. 927 F.2d at 531.
38. Id




In the area ofjoint ventures the Tenth Circuit in Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co.40 returns again to a hands-off approach to the interpretation of
a federal statute. Sullivan dealt with the Federal Employer Liability Act
(FELA),4 1 which governs the liability of federal employers when they are
sued in tort for injuries to employees. The trend in this area has re-
cently been toward interpretary deregulation. In the face of financial
instability, regulators have merely redefined organizations falling within
their regulatory authority. In this context, FELA has been interpreted to
exclude companies owning railroad track and cars from the definition of
"common carrier" unless they carry the public for hire.4 2
In Sullivan, Scoular Grain Company and Freeport, a commercial
warehouse lessor, entered into a joint venture to provide commercial
grain storage at a railroad yard. Scoular paid for workers compensation
insurance and ran the daily operations. An employee of the joint ven-
ture lost his left arm and leg while unloading grain at the railroad yard.
After collecting $200,000 in worker's compensation benefits, the em-
ployee sued the joint venture, the two businesses and the railroad for
negligence under FELA. One of the venturers paid workers compensa-
tion premiums and both companies claimed immunity under the state's
worker compensation statute. In addition, both companies asserted that
they were not "common carriers" within the meaning of the term in
FELA. The district court exercized pendant jurisdiction over the state
law claims, granted summary judgment for the joint venture on both
issues and found that there was no genuine issue of material fact regard-
ing either the status of the companies as common carriers, or their im-
munity under the Utah workers compensation statute.
43
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that although
the two companies received grain shipped by railroad companies and
stored grain adjacent to the tracks owned by railroad companies, their
operations were not sufficient to bring them within the statutory defini-
tion of common carrier under FELA. 44 Additionally, the court found
that the immunity granted under state law to immediate employers who
pay compensation extends to all members of a joint venture even when
the compensation is paid only by one of the venturers. 45 Framing the
issue as whether every operator who uses the railroad and its operations
falls under FELA's jurisdiction,4 6 the court adopted the Supreme
Court's analysis in Edwards v. Pacific Fruit Express.4 7 That case held that a
refrigerator car company that owned its own refrigerator cars was not a
40. 930 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1991).
41. FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 57 (1988).
42. 930 F.2d at 800.
43. Id. at 799.
44. Id at 800-01.
45. Id at 800-02.
46. Id at 800.
47. 390 U.S. 538 (1968).
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common carrier because it did not carry the public for profit.48 The
Tenth Circuit declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's four-part test to de-
termine common carrier status,4 9 adopting instead the practice in the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits of using that test as a discretionary
"consideration." 5 0
IV. TRADE REGULATIONS
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered three very
different cases in the areas of trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition, price discrimination and the application of the Petroleum Market-
ing Practices Act to a breach of contract claim. In none of these cases
did the court establish new law.
A. Incontestable Trademark Infringement Requires Showing of Likelihood of
Confusion: Coherent Incorporated v. Coherent Technologies,
Incorporated
51
In Coherent the Tenth Circuit stated that even plaintiffs with incon-
testable trademarks must show the likelihood of confusion to make a
prima facie case of statutory trademark infringement.5 2 The court reaf-
firmed the principle that incontestability, while giving the plaintiff the
right to use a trademark, does not, as a matter of law, establish auto-
matic infringement by another user.5 3 While the court affirmed the dis-
trict court's conclusion, it explicitly set out the appropriate method of
analysis. Coherent involved a California laser manufacturer with incon-
testable rights to the trademark "Coherent, Inc." The manufacturer
sued a Colorado laser radar systems distributor for federal trademark
infringement and false designation of origin for its use of the word "co-
herent" in its name and for unfair competition under Colorado common
law. Though both were involved in laser technology, the two firms were
not direct competitors because they operated in different markets, made
different end-products and marketed through different channels. Their
buyers were sophisticated engineers, project managers or corporate offi-
cials who bought products built to exact specifications. Following a
bench trial, the district court held that no infringement existed.5 4
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, holding
that a plaintiff with an incontestable trademark must show the likelihood
48. 930 F.2d at 800.
49. Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee, 380 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1967). In Lone Star,
The Fifth Circuit used the following four elements to determine if the defendant was a
"common carrier" under FELA: First, whether there was actual performance of rail serv-
ices; second, whether service being performed was contracted by the public; third, whether
the defendant was engaged in interstate commerce by virtue of a contractual relationship
with a railroad; and, fourth, whether defendant received remuneration from a railroad.
50. 930 F.2d at 801.
51. 935 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 1124.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1123-24.
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of confusuion as an element in an infringement case.5 5 The court found
that interpretation of federal trademark law5 6 requires the giving of
some meaning to the 1988 amendment that states "such conclusive evi-
dence of the right to use the mark shall be subject to proof of infringe-
ment. .... -57 The court interpreted this statement as evidence of the
legislative intent to require a plaintiff to prove likelihood of confusion
between two trademarks. 58 The court determined the likelihood of con-
fusion to be a question of fact, and outlined four factors persuasive in
holding that the differences between the two companies outweighed
their similarities. Those factors are: (1) the name "coherent" was
adopted by the Colorado company in good faith; (2) the companies were
not competitors; (3) the companies marketed different products in dif-
ferent markets through different channels; and (4) the buyers of the
companies' products were sophisticated individuals who demanded
items built to exact specifications. 59 Despite survey evidence introduced
by the plaintiff showing likely confusion, the court upheld the district
court's holding of no likelihood of confusion. The court stated that,
contrary to the plaintiff's submission, such surveys must demonstrate
actual market conditions or simulate marketplace decision-making to be
valid.6
0
B. Technical Obsolescence or Introduction of New Products as a Valid
"Changing Conditions" Defense to Claims of Price Discrimination:
Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Telephones, Inc.
6 1
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discriminatory
pricing in goods of like quality, which might substantially lessen compe-
tition or create a monopoly.6 2 Courts, however, do allow price differen-
tials occasionally where they are "in response to changing conditions
affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned,
such as, but not limited to, actual or imminent deterioration of perisha-
ble goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods ... or sales in good faith in
discontinuance of business in the goods concerned."'6 3 Thus, if the
seller can show that it was operating under a variation in the usual mar-
ket circumstances, that these changes were outside of his or her compet-
itor's control and that the market change resembles one enumerated in
the Act, then the seller's pricing behavior is not actionable under the
"changing conditions" defense. The defense is usually narrow in scope
and limited in application, thereby providing for little judicial analysis.
55. Ide at 1124.
56. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 through 1127 (1988).
57. 935 F.2d at 1125.
58. Id
59. Id
60. It at 1126.
61. 931 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1991).
62. FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT,
328 (1962). See aI/SJULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, 5 ANTITRUST LAws & TRADE REGULATIONS,
§ 32.04 (1969).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
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The Tenth Circuit's treatment of the defense in Comcoa, although some-
what broader than usual, was a typical summary treatment of the law.
There, the court held that technical obsolescence or the introduction of
a new product model satisfies the changing conditions defense when the
facts are at least similar to those established in Section 2(a) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act.6
In Comcoa, a defendant phone manufacturer produced two types of
business telephones and offered a volume discount to some of its cus-
tomers. Plaintiffs were phone equipment distributors who, despite their
requests, were denied the same discounts for similar purchases. The
distributors sued the manufacturer, alleging lost sales, lost assets, per-
manent business injury as a result of price discrimination, interference
with prospective business relations and a breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted the defendant
summary judgment on the issue of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, but submitted the remaining issues to the jury, which ren-
dered a verdict in favor of the defendant on the remaining claims.
6 5
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict regarding price discrim-
ination and intentional interference with prospective business relations,
but reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendant on
the issue of breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
6 6
The court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the trial court's failure
to submit jury instructions containing the statutory examples of chang-
ing conditions was error. Reading Robinson-Patman's explicit language
to extend the changing conditions defense beyond those substantially
similar to those enumerated in the statute, the court found that pricing
modifications due to technical obsolescence and the introduction of a
new product are sufficiently similar to the statute's given excuses to con-
stitute a valid defense. 67 The court concluded that the purpose of the
changing conditions exception to liability under the Robinson-Patman
Act is to facilitate the ready disposition of goods. To find "obsolescence
of some goods" to be a valid changing condition under the Act, the
court took a substance-over-form approach to the legislation, which was
largely enacted to protect small businesses. The court apparently recog-
nized that fluid market conditions would be enhanced if fact finders con-
sider not only conditions affecting sellers of particular goods, but also
temporary and special conditions affecting industry in general.
This slightly more expansive reading of the provision may, as in
Comcoa, deny the ready disposition of goods-exactly opposite of the in-
tent of Congress when passing the law. 6 8 The court's decision, how-
ever, is defensible as an implicit recognition that technical
"perishability" is indistinguishable from changing conditions as enu-
64. 931 F.2d at 661.
65. Id. at 658-59.
66. lId at 667.
67. Id. at 661.
68. Id at 662 n.8.
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merated in the Act. Such conditions may alter market conditions be-
yond the seller's control, thereby justifying differential pricing.
C. Applicability of Petroleum Marketing Practices Act to Termination of
Distributors Agreement: Metro Oil Co., Inc. v. Sun Refining
and Marketing Co.
69
The case of Metro Oil explores whether a change in credit terms
under a distributors agreement constitutes a termination of the agree-
ment and, thus, bringing it within the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
(PMPA). 70 The Tenth Circuit held that the changed terms terminated
the franchise agreement in violation of the PMPA, but that the plaintiff's
suit for breach of contract and tortious interference with business rela-
tionships was barred by the PMPA's one-year statute of limitations.
7 1
In Metro Oil, a wholesale distributor of motor fuel entered into a
series of distributor agreements with a manufacturer of such fuel. The
agreements provided in pertinent part that the manufacturer could es-
tablish the terms under which the distributor would pay for the product
and that the agreements were subject to and governed by the PMPA.
Subsequently, the distributor failed to pay certain invoices or to provide
the requested proof of its ability to pay. The manufacturer changed the
terms and conditions of payment to cash on delivery. From that point,
the distributor alleged that the defendant had wrongfully terminated the
contract, causing distributor to lose dealers. In a letter to the defendant,
the distributor threatened to initiate suit under the PMPA after which
the parties ceased doing business with each other. Two years later the
distributor sued the manufacturer. The district court found the contract
was governed by the PMPA, but that the PMPA's one-year statute of
limitations barred the action. The court also held the plaintiff's claim
for tortious interference was time-barred by Oklahoma's two-year stat-
ute of limitations for torts. 72 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision, holding that the suit was governed by the PMPA and,
therefore, it was time-barred. The court concluded that summary judg-
ment for defendants was proper because no genuine issue of material
fact existed on the question of the PMPA's applicability and that the dis-
trict court correctly applied the substantive law.73 Framing the issue as
whether the action was based upon a termination as contemplated under
the PMPA, the court took a common sense approach that a suit, litigat-
ing a defendant's noncompliance with an agreement subject to the
PMPA, required an interpretation that the defendants were actually cov-
ered by the statute. The court found that the only remaining issue for
trial was which party terminated the agreement and that in either case
the plaintiff could not prevail.74 Upon review of the Oklahoma statute,
69. 936 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1991).
70. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801 through 2824.
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the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the limita-
tion accrues upon the date of the tortious act or breach, and not upon




In 1991, the Tenth Circuit decided four Corporate Law cases.
None of these cases represents a significant departure in the law and are,
thus, only briefly discussed below.
A. Liability of Successor Corporation Under State Products Liability Laws:
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Corp.
76
In Williams, the court addressed the requirements that must be met
under Oklahoma law before a successor corporation to a defunct prede-
cessor can be held liable for injuries caused by products manufactured
by the predecessor. Williams, the plaintiff, was injured while operating
equipment manufactured by Bowman Hydro-Vat, Inc. Following liqui-
dation of Bowman Hydro-Vat, Jim Bowman, the owner, formed a new
corporation, Bowman Livestock Equipment Corporation. Williams
brought suit against the new company alleging that as a successor corpo-
ration, Bowman Livestock was liable for the injuries caused by Bowman
Hydro-Vat's product.
The district court dismissed the action finding no in personamjuris-
diction over Bowman Livestock. 77 The Tenth Circuit determined that
Bowman Hydro-Vat's contacts with the forum could be imputed to Bow-
man Livestock if the forum's law would hold Bowman Livestock liable
for the actions of its alleged predecessor, Bowman Hydro-Vat. The
court then addressed the law regarding successor liability in Oklahoma.
Oklahoma law requires either a defacto merger, a fraudulent transaction
or a new corporation that is a mere continuation of a former corporation
before a court will find that a new company is a successor to a former
one.7 8 In addition, there must be some evidence of an agreement to
assume liabilities and a sale or transfer of all, or substantially all, assets
from a former to a latter corporation must be made.79 The court deter-
mined that in this instance, none of the requirements of Oklahoma law
was met. Since Bowman Livestock was determined not to be a successor
to Bowman Hydro-Vat, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.
B. Excuse of Duty to Pay After Receipt of Defective Goods: Oral-X Corp. v.
Farnam Cos., Inc.
8 0
In Oral-X, a manufacturer of horse products, Oral-X, shipped a
75. Id.
76. 927 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1991).
77. Id at 1130.
78. Id. at 1132 n.8.
79. Id at 1132.
80. 931 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1991).
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small quantity of defective product to its buyer, Farnam. Thereafter,
Farnam canceled its remaining orders. Oral-X sued Farnam for breach
of the marketing agreement, and Farnam sued Oral-X for breach of im-
plied and express warranties. The district court entered judgment for
Oral-X for unpaid production costs and royalties on product received,
but denied Oral-X's request for royalties on Famam's canceled orders.
The Tenth Circuit found that there was no material breach under
Arizona law when Oral-X shipped a small amount of the product that
did not contain an essential ingredient, nor were any warranties
breached by Oral-X.8 1 Furthermore, the court agreed with the district
court that Oral-X was entitled to royalties from product already shipped,
but stated that the district court erred in refusing to award Oral-X royal-
ties for the orders that were canceled. The court determined that the
royalties on the canceled orders were not too speculative in this case and
that Oral-X was entitled to them.
8 2
C. Non-Occurrence of Condition Precedent and Non-Performance Under a B-B
Company v. PiperJaffray & Hopwood, Inc. 83
In B-B Co., B-B, a corporation planning to purchase and develop
resort property, sued Piper Jaffray, a bond underwriter that had prom-
ised to underwrite special improvement district bonds for B-B. The dis-
trict court issued summary judgment in favor of Piper Jaffray.84 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that creation of a special improvement
district was a condition precedent to PiperJaffray's obligation to under-
write bonds. The court determined that, since Piper Jaffray had prom-
ised only to underwrite special improvement district bonds and no other
bonds, failure of the creation of a special improvement district was also a
failure of a condition precedent. Therefore, PiperJaffray was under no
obligation to B-B, and it did not breach its promise.85
D. Summary Judgment in a Case for Specific Performance of a Contract:
Deepwater Investments, Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp.
8 6
In Deepwater Investments, Deepwater entered into bargaining with
Jackson Hole Ski Corporation to purchase part of a ski resort's opera-
tion. After lengthy and involved negotiations, the parties developed an
"interim agreement" and soon disagreements emerged between them.
Eventually, Deepwater sued Jackson Hole Ski Corporation for specific
performance, and upon a motion for summary judgment, the district
court awarded Deepwater summary judgment for specific perform-
ance. 87 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, stating that the
81. Id. at 670.
82. Id. at 671.
83. 931 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1991).
84. Id. at 676.
85. Id. at 678.
86. 938 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 1109.
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existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judg-
ment for Deepwater and that the issue of whether a contract had been
entered into was a question of fact for the fact finder to determine.
8 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The survey period covered by this Article brought decisions from
the Tenth Circuit that show either great deference to, or broad con-
struction of, various legislation - as with the banking cases - or conform-
ity with established law - as with the remaining cases. The court
exhibited a willingness to yield to the decisions of financial institution
regulators, while applying accepted principles of law in the areas of
trade regulation and corporate law in general.
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